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events. The building comes to life
through the experiences of the strong
cast of personalities who planned, built,
upgraded, repaired, and worked within
it throughout the first sixty years of its
history. Vogel’s story takes shape in
early 1941, with Franklin Roosevelt’s
War Department and its concerns
about the ability of the United States to
plan for and wage what it saw as a coming global war. At that time, the War
Department had twenty-four thousand
employees, scattered throughout Washington, D.C., Virginia, and Maryland,
in twenty-three separate buildings, including apartments, shacks, and even a
Leary’s Garage at 24th and M streets.
After Germany invaded Russia in June
1941, the requirement for more space
was urgent, and the Army turned to
Brigadier General Brehon B. Somervell,
its Quartermaster Corps’s Chief of
Construction Division, to solve the
problem.
Vogel fills with color and detail his
story of the fast-paced construction of
the largest office building in the world.
By March 1942, over ten thousand men
were working on the site. They dredged
680,000 tons of sand and gravel from
the Potomac and pounded in 41,492
concrete piles and columns that would
support a building with 17.5 miles of
corridors and five floors, plus a mezzanine and basement.
Vogel does not end his story with the
completion of the building in February
1943. He describes numerous later
events as diverse as General Eisenhower’s getting lost in the building, the
Navy brass refusing to move in, and
stories of secretaries of defense James
Forrestal and Robert McNamara. His
book includes chapters on the Vietnam
antiwar protests at the Pentagon on 21

Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2008

October 1967 and on the over-billiondollar “remaking” of the Pentagon during major improvements and upgrades
during the 1990s. The two concluding
and most moving chapters relate the
tragic loss of 184 lives and the destruction and repair of the west side of the
Pentagon from the horrific impact of
the hijacked American Airlines Flight
77 on 11 September 2001. Despite the
damage the building held, in part due
to the strength of the spiral steel reinforcing bar used in the concrete columns during its original construction.
Perhaps this and the related remarkable
story of the rebuilding of the Pentagon
in less than a year are fitting testimonies
to the quality of the people and builders
of yesterday and today. Vogel has stated
that “it took me longer to write the
book than it took them to build the
Pentagon.” No doubt true, but Vogel’s
book and its story of a Washington
landmark and a globally recognized
icon of American power were worth the
wait.
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College

Kinnard, Douglas. The War Managers: Thirtieth
Anniversary Edition. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2007. 216pp. $19.95

This unique and classic book was based
on a sixty-item questionnaire administered to 173 U.S. Army officers who
served as commanding generals in the
Vietnam War. The author, Douglas
Kinnard, a West Point graduate and
Princeton PhD, served two tours in
Vietnam, including one as a brigadier
general, and was known to many if not
all of his respondents. The postal survey
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was fielded in September 1974, when
the author, having retired from active
duty, was on the faculty of the University of Vermont. Kinnard’s guarantees
of anonymity and his rapport with his
peers elicited a response rate of nearly
70 percent. Many of those surveyed also
added written commentaries. Questions
dealt with a range of issues, including
strategy, tactics, personnel management, the role of the media, rules of engagement, and recommended changes
“if we had to do it over.” The findings
are disturbing, not only for people who
lived through the Vietnam era but for
those of us who are witnesses to history
repeating itself in Iraq. Nearly 70 percent of the generals who responded
stated that they were uncertain of the
Vietnam War’s objectives. Many conceded that they had overestimated the
capability of South Vietnamese forces
and had underestimated the extent of
the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s
corruption and ineptitude. Over 50 percent of respondents thought that U.S.
forces should not have engaged in combat in Vietnam. These views were recorded some seven months before the
fall of Saigon.

among the generals. This is not surprising, given the risks such dissent would
have posed to their careers. Writing in
1976, in the immediate postwar and
Watergate years, Kinnard was cautiously optimistic that the officer corps
could henceforth stand up and be
counted. Unfortunately, thirty years
later, dissent still remains hazardous to
one’s career.

Among the richest data in the book are
the marginal notations by the respondents. It was widely acknowledged that
the system for measurement of progress, based on body counts and kill ratios, fell victim to the natural optimistic
bias of military men. The system was
denounced by one respondent as “a
fake—totally worthless.” Another general replied, “The immensity of the false
reporting is a blot on the honor of the
Army.”

PETER GRABOSKY

Kinnard devotes a good deal of attention to the fact that despite such perceptions, dissent had been uncommon
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Without wishing to strain comparisons
between Iraq and Vietnam, one cannot
read Kinnard’s book without developing a sad sense of history repeating itself. He reminds us that “in the
Vietnam War there was too much tricky
optimism from LBJ on down.” Misplaced faith in the integrity and capacity of the local forces has a familiar ring.
So too do cover-ups of egregious human rights abuses and insensitivity to
indigenous culture.
One hopes that among the generals who
have served or who will serve in Iraq,
there is one who might be tempted to
follow in Kinnard’s footsteps and seek
the candid views of his or her peers
about the conflict. The same lessons remain to be learned.
The Australian National University

Holloway, James L., III. Aircraft Carriers at War:
A Personal Retrospective of Korea, Vietnam, and
the Soviet Confrontation. Annapolis, Md.: Naval
Institute Press, 2007. 479pp. $34.95

For three decades, Admiral James L.
Holloway III has been one of the great
supporters and promoters of the work
of the U.S. Navy’s historians, through
his role as president and then chairman
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